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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In the secret reconstruction of Shamir’s (t,n) secret sharing scheme (SS), shares 
released by shareholders need to be protected otherwise, non-shareholders can also obtain the 
secret.  Key establishment protocol can establish pairwise keys for any pair of shareholders. 
Then, shareholders can use these pairwise keys to protect shares in the secret reconstruction 
process.  However, adding a key establishment in the secret reconstruction slows down the 
process significantly.  Shamir’s SS is based on a univariate polynomial. Shares generated by a 
bivariate polynomial enable pairwise keys to be shared between any pair of shareholders. But 
we proposed a new type of SS, called protected secret sharing scheme (PSS), in which shares 
of shareholders can not only be used to reconstruct the secret but also be used to protect the 
secrecy of shares in the secret reconstruction process.  Thus, the recovered secret is only 
available to shareholders but not to non-shareholders. A basic (t,n) PSS based on a bivariate 
polynomial is proposed.  Furthermore, we introduce to use this basic PSS in the applications 
of threshold cryptography.  The PSS is unique since it protects the secrecy of the recovered 
secret in a very efficient way. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In cryptography, a secret sharing scheme is a method for distributing a secret amongst 
a group of participants, each of which is allocated a share of the secret. The secret can only be 
reconstructed when the shares are combined. Individual shares are of no use on their own. 
Highly sensitive and highly important data like encryption keys, missile launch codes and 
numbered bank accounts, must be kept highly confidential as their exposure is highly 
disastrous and a single point failure might cause great loss. Secret sharing schemes are very 
useful for such kind of data, as they won’t keep the entire secret in one place, so that both the 
above-mentioned problems can be overseen.  
1.1 Secret Sharing 
In the traditional encryption methods in which we store the secret in one place or keep 
duplicate of secret in multiple places. It does not avoid the single point failure in the former 
scenario, and the later scenario is much more dangerous as it endangers the confidentiality of 
the secret due to duplicates. And it also adds the up the attack vectors, increasing the chance 
of the secret to fall into wrong hands. Secret sharing solves these problems with arbitrarily 
high levels of confidentiality and reliability. Consider a bank account where there is a vault 
that must be opened every day. The bank employs several senior tellers, who are trusted enough 
to participate in the opening of the vault, but not trusted to the tent that they themselves own 
the combination to the vault. Vault can only be opened by all the senior teller participation but 
one individual cannot open it. This is one practical example to show the implementation of 
secret sharing. 
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In Cloud Computing, which is the emerging phenomena now, secret sharing is gaining 
more importance. Many servers had to share common resources in cloud computing. So, we 
distribute the secret among servers, and then reconstructed when needed by using shared key 
from each server. Sensor networks where the links are liable to be tapped, are secured by using 
secret sharing where we send the data in shares, which makes the task of eavesdropper hard. 
Security can be more enhanced by continuously changing the pattern of secret reconstruction. 
Secret Sharing is very important in network applications. The security of operations 
that are happening over computer networks has become very predominant as everything is 
online now like payments, voting, mail etc. Bad users who may try to misuse the systems must 
be guarded as they might steal credit card numbers, impersonate other users, read personal mail 
and so on. “Reduced Trust”, is a well-known principle in the analog world, the less knowledge 
or power each entity has to keep a secret, the more secure is the secret. Many important files 
have one key, which is used to access them. If such a key is lost, due to any reason like hard 
disk crash, credentials not available, then all the files become inaccessible. We are facing a 
single point failure here and have to search for backup options which might lead to the loss of 
secret. While performing encryption, key is to be stored as to allow no one more power to use 
it, we have to ensure that the key is stored properly. To address these problems in networks, 
Secret Sharing is used.  
Secret Sharing schemes enable some predetermined sets of parties to reconstruct a 
given secret. This makes it easy to store a secret information in a network such that only good 
subsets can reconstruct the secret and perform actions. One good example of secret sharing is 
that good passwords are hard to remember. A clever user can use a secret sharing scheme, to 
generate shares for the password and store one share in his address book, one in his bank 
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deposit safe, leave one secret with a friend, etc. If any day he forgets his password, he can 
reconstruct it easily. This is a typical example of a secure backup system.  
Secret sharing involves all the shareholders to perform in secret reconstruction. But 
what if one shareholder is not available. What if his share is corrupted, lost or stolen? Then we 
again come back to the point of failure. Hence, we need to be able to reconstruct the secret 
even without participation of all shareholders. Then comes the point of threshold cryptography. 
Consider an example where the director of a bank could generate shares for the bank’s 
vault and hand them out to his employees. Even if he is not available, the vault can be opened, 
but only, when a certain number of employees do it together. That certain number is called 
threshold. Threshold cryptography is the art of chopping a secret into little bits, so that the 
secret can only be learned by possessing more than a threshold number of those bits. In the 
context of cloud computing, threshold cryptography is described as a highly sensitive action 
like decryption or signing, which is performed by a group of cooperative servers in such a way 
that no minority of servers are able to perform the operations themselves, nor are they able to 
prevent the other servers from performing the operation when it is required. A good example 
of an application whose security could be greatly improved with a threshold solution is a 
network certification authority, a trusted entity that certifies that certifies that a given public 
key corresponds to a given user.  
 The (t,n) secret sharing scheme (SS) was proposed by Shamir [1] and Blakley [2] 
separately in 1979.  In a (t,n) SS, the dealer divides the secret into n shares and distributes each 
share to corresponding shareholder secretly such that (a) the secret can be recovered if there 
are t or more than t shares available, and (b) the secret cannot be recovered if there are fewer 
than t shares.  Desmedt and Frankel, Pedersen, Gennaro et. al., ate the major contributors 
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towards threshold cryptography. The (t,n) SS can be implemented by using many different 
mathematical tools.  For example, Shamir’s scheme is based on a linear polynomial, Blakely’s 
scheme [1] is based on the geometry, Mignotte’s scheme [3] and Asmuth-Bloom's scheme [4] 
are based on the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT). There are many research papers on the 
subject of SS in the literature and SS has become one of fundamental tools in secure multi-
party computing.  The secret reconstruction of Shamir’s SS is very simple and is based on the 
Lagrange interpolation formula. However, in secret reconstruction, shares released by 
shareholders need to be protected; otherwise, non-shareholders can also obtain the secret.  Key 
establishment protocol can establish pairwise keys for any pair of shareholders. Then, 
shareholders can use these pairwise keys to protect shares released by shareholders in the 
process.  However, adding a key establishment protocol in the secret reconstruction can slow 
down the secret recovering process significantly.   
A real time example of threshold scheme is referring to Time Magazine, May 4, 1992, 
control of nuclear weapons in Russia involves a two-out-of-three mechanism. In order to 
launch a nuclear missile, the cooperation of at least two parties out of three are needed. The 
three parties involved are the president, the Defense Minister, and the Defense Ministry. 
Efficient threshold schemes can be very helpful in the management of cryptographic keys. 
In order to protect data, we can encrypt it, but in order to protect the encryption key we need a 
different method. The most secure key management scheme keeps the key in a single, well-
guarded location. This scheme is highly unreliable since a single misfortune can make the 
information inaccessible. An obvious solution is to store multiple copies of the key at different 
locations, but this increases the danger of security breaches. By using a (t, n) threshold scheme 
we get a very robust key management scheme: We can recover the original key even when t 
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keys are used, but our opponents cannot reconstruct the key even when security breaches 
expose t-1 of the remaining t pieces. Threshold schemes are ideally suited to applications in 
which a group of mutually suspicious individuals with conflicting interests must cooperate. 
Ideally we would like the cooperation to be based on mutual consent, but the veto power this 
mechanism gives to each member can paralyze the activities of the group. By properly 
choosing the k and n parameters we can give any sufficiently large majority the authority to 
take some action while giving any sufficiently large minority the power to block it. 
Shares in Shamir’s (t,n) SS can be used to reconstruct only one secret. This is because, in 
the secret reconstruction, the secret and shares are revealed to all shareholders. To improve the 
efficiency of a SS, the threshold cryptography was first introduced by Desmedt in 1987 [5]. 
Threshold cryptography is the study of multiparty computation protocols for different 
cryptographic functions (e.g. signing or decrypting) in which each group member receives a 
share of a private key generated by the group manager (GM) initially and then uses the share 
later to jointly compute an output of the cryptographic function.  Shamir’s (t,n) SS has been 
used in conjunction with other public-key algorithms, such as RSA scheme [6] or ElGamal 
scheme [7], in threshold algorithms.  For example, [8, 9] are based on the ElGamal scheme, 
Various [10-13] are based on the RSA, [14, 15] are based on the Elliptic Curve public-key 
scheme and [16] is based on Pairing.  The RSA algorithm is the predominant mode used today 
for public-key cryptography. The basic goal of public-key threshold RSA cryptography is to 
efficiently apply RSA on behalf of a group in a way that ensures integrity, availability, and the 
security of the private key and the modulus factors. Threshold RSA systems propose a middle 
ground, which will allow a threshold of any t out of n participants to perform a private key 
RSA modular exponentiation , while t-1 parties cannot perform it and in fact are unable to gain 
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information about the private key. An important aspect of the proposed schemes is that the 
resulting group-generated signature is indistinguishable to a verifier from the RSA signature 
of a single signer. Since shares are protected by public-key algorithms, shares can be used 
repeatedly to compute multiple outputs.  Both SS and threshold cryptography are very active 
research areas in cryptography.  In the processing to compute output of a threshold function, 
values computed by group members also need to be protected; otherwise, non-members can 
obtain the output as well. For example, in a threshold decryption, non-members can recover 
the plaintext if information exchanged among group members is not protected.  Thus, the 
security problem as we have described in the secret reconstruction process also exists in 
threshold cryptographic applications. 
1.2 Contribution 
In secret sharing schemes, a secret s is divided into n shares by a dealer D and is 
distributed among n shareholders. The shares are shared among the shareholders. Until now 
there is no way to authenticate the shareholder and check whether the shares are authentic. 
Non-Shareholders who claim to have a share may lead to false secret or can get access to the 
secret. So, to avoid the access to non-shareholder we introduce a new type of SS, called 
protected Secret Sharing(PSS) Scheme. In a PSS Scheme, shares of shareholders generated by 
the dealer initially can not only be used to recover the secret but also be used to protect shares 
in the secret reconstruction. Therefore, PSS is an efficient way to protect the recovered secret 
from non-shareholders. we also propose a basic PSS based on a bivariate polynomial.  
Bivariate polynomials have been used to design verifiable secret sharing scheme (VSS) [17-
19] and pairwise key distribution [20-25]. We extend the PSS to the applications of threshold 
cryptography. 
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1.3 Thesis Outline 
 
The Thesis is organized as follows, In the next Chapter We Discussed about work 
related to Secret Sharing, the Shamir Secret Sharing the following chapters we discuss a new 
type of Secret Sharing scheme which is called protected secret sharing (PSS), in which shares 
of shareholders can not only be used to compute the secret but also be used to protect shares 
in the secret reconstruction. 
In the 3rd chapter we focused our approach on a basic (t,n) PSS based on a bivariate 
polynomial and is proposed. Our basic (t,n) PSS scheme is based on a bivariate polynomial is 
proposed. We gave detailed analysis of the proposed protocol in this chapter. In 4th Chapter we 
focused on the security and performance of the proposed Scheme and then we introduced to 
use PSS in applications of threshold cryptography. In 5th Chapter we focused on the application 
of our proposed scheme in threshold cryptography. The Last Chapter is concluded with the 
problems and future work of the proposed scheme.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
RELATED WORK 
 
2.1 Basic Schemes 
 
In this chapter, we briefly discuss Shamir’s secret sharing scheme in detail. We 
addressed the problem of authenticating the shareholders in the later part of this section and 
schemes proposed to overcome this problem like Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) are 
discussed. We discussed about the proposal of using bivariate polynomial in Protected Secret 
Sharing to authenticate shareholders. 
In cryptography, distributing a secret among a group of participants is called secret 
sharing. Each of the participant is allocated a part of secret called “share”. The secret can only 
be reconstructed when the shares are combined together, individual shares are of no use. The 
primitives of cryptography mainly constitute of secret sharing and its variations. A share 
generation scheme and a secret reconstruction protocol are the main process in any secret 
sharing scheme. A protocol for distributing a secret among multiple parties is discussed in 
share generation and its reconstruction by combining shares from multiple parties is discussed 
in secret reconstruction. Basic schemes address the problem of secret key reconstruction 
assuming all parties to be honest. 
Secret Sharing Schemes can be classified in to following: 
1. Based on share’s capabilities: 
a. Dynamic Secret Sharing: the ability to change the access structure, the dealer has the 
ability to change a particular access structure, out of a given set and/or allow 
participants to reconstruct different secret in different time instants. 
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b. Proactive Secret Sharing: updating of shares periodically, was proposed by Ostrovsky 
and Yung[34], which does not consider the old shares and uses new shares generated 
periodically. This concept was applied to secret sharing by Hezberg et al [35].  
c. Secret sharing with veto capability: blocking of reconstruction. It is a feature where 
qualified set can prevent any other set of participants from reconstructing the secret 
key. 
2. Based on computation power of participants: 
a. Computational Secret Sharing: Participants are computationally bounded. Eg: 
Krawczyk[36],CSS allows achieving better information rate. Information rate (ρ) is 
defined as the ratio between average length of the share (in bits) given to the 
participants and the length of the secret. 
b. Verifiable Secret Sharing: Qualifying set will be able to recover the secret and 
disqualified set should not recover the secret. As per verifiable secret sharing, honest 
players should be able to recover the secret and corrupted players should get no 
information on it. Tompa and Woll[37] initially introduces cheating in secret sharing, 
Individual user tricks other users by using fault shares, that is adopted in Shamir’s (k,n) 
scheme. Ogata et al.[38], finally provides an efficient mode of detecting cheating in 
secret sharing 
c. Robust Secret Sharing: Recovering correct secrets in the presence of more number of 
faulty and corrupted shares. It allows the secret to be reconstructed in the presence of 
an active adversary who is to corrupt shares. McEliece and Sarwate[39], found first 
solution to the problem of designing Robust Secret Sharing. 
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3. CRT schemes: It rely on Chinese Remainder Theorem. CRT based Asmuth and Bloom[40], 
secret sharing scheme shares the secret S among ‘n’ parties by modulator arithmetic such 
that any ‘t’ users can reconstruct the secret by the CRT. 
In this work, we mainly concentrate on Verifiable Secret Sharing(VSS) and discuss it under 
threshold cryptography. In a secret sharing scheme, a dealer divides the secret among 
shareholders and any authorized set of shareholders can reconstruct the secret but any 
unauthorized set gain no information about secret.  
  In Shamir’s (t,n) scheme, shareholders cannot verify the validity of their shares from 
the dealer. We can overcome this by using Protected Secret Sharing(PSS), which has its roots 
in Verifiability Secret Sharing (VSS) which was first proposed by Chor et al[26].  
 Protected Secret Sharing(PSS) addresses the problem of verifying the shareholders and 
is based on bivariate polynomial. Invalid shares maybe caused either by the dealer during share 
generation or by channel noise during transmission. If invalid shares are detected, shareholders 
can request the dealer to generate new shares. In a PSS scheme, shares of shareholders are not 
only used to recover the secret but also be used to protect the shares in secret reconstruction. 
In PSS, shares are generated using a bivariate polynomial, and it is reconstructed by 
establishing pairwise keys between shareholders and based on symmetric property of the 
polynomial coefficients.  
 The idea of Protected Secret Sharing is that; the recovered secret is to be protected from 
non-shareholders.  Using a bivariate polynomial, shares are generated by the dealer using 
public information of shareholders and are sent to shareholders secretly. Next, if a particular 
number of shareholders want to reconstruct the secret, each shareholder uses his share to 
compute pairwise shared keys, between any other shareholder. It sends its share in an encrypted 
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form using shared key to all other shareholders. It also receives encrypted message from all 
other shareholders and decrypts it using the shared secret key. The, each shareholder can use 
recovered shares to establish linearly independent equations, which are coefficients of the 
bivariate polynomial. Then, the secret is reconstructed using a0,0 =s. 
 If we consider the following problem, where in we can’t verify the shareholders, then 
the secret is reconstructed from the disqualified set if they are able to get the shares of qualified 
set. Because, Shamir’s secret is based on univariate polynomial, where in we can’t authenticate 
the shareholders. We need to add key establishment, which makes the process of secret 
reconstruction slow. In Protected Secret Sharing, we are using bivariate polynomial which is 
useful for authentication. Let us discuss the Shamir’s (t,n) scheme in detail. 
2.1.1 Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme 
A secret sharing scheme divides a secret s into n shares by a dealer D and distributes  
them among n shareholders P = {P1,P2 .....,Pn} in such a way that at least t shares are required 
to reconstruct the secret and less than t shares gain no information about the secret. The (t,n) 
threshold secret sharing schemes were introduced by Shamir [29] and Blakley [6] 
independently in 1979. A (t,n) threshold secret sharing scheme allows any t or more than t 
shareholders to reconstruct the secret; while fewer than t shareholders can gain no information 
about the secret. This technique enables the construction of robust key management schemes 
for cryptographic systems that can function securely and reliably even when misfortunes 
destroy half the pieces and security breaches expose all but one of the remaining pieces.key 
management schemes for cryptographic systems that can function securely and reliably even 
when misfortunes destroy half the pieces and security breaches expose all but one of the 
remaining pieces. 
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in [34], Liu considers the following problem: 
  “Eleven scientists are working on a secret project. They wish to lock up the documents 
in a cabinet so that the cabinet can be opened if and only if six or more of the scientists are 
present. What is the smallest number of locks needed? What is the smallest number of keys to 
the locks each scientist must carry?”  
Solution to this problem is not hard to show that the minimal solution uses 462 locks 
and 252 keys per scientist. These numbers are clearly impractical, and they become 
exponentially worse when the numbers of scientists increase. we generalize the problem to one 
In which the secret is s (e.g., the safe combination) and in which non-mechanical solutions are 
also allowed. Our goal is to divide s Into n pieces U1,U2,U3,…Un in such a way that:  
(1) knowledge of secret s is only possible with t or more than t Shares and finding s is easily 
computable;  
(2) knowledge of secret s is not possible with t-1 Shares or less and finding s is completely 
undetermined. In the sense that all its possible values are equally likely.  
Such a scheme is called a (t,n) threshold scheme.  
Efficient threshold schemes can be very helpful in the management of cryptographic 
keys. In order to protect data we can encrypt the data, but in order to protect the encryption 
key we need a different method (further encryptions change the problem rather than solve it). 
The most secure key management scheme keeps the key in a single, well-guarded location let’s 
say a computer, a human brain, or a safe). This scheme is highly unreliable since a single 
misfortune such as a computer breakdown or sudden death or sabotage can make the 
information inaccessible. So an obvious solution for this problem is to store multiple copies of 
the key at different locations, but this increases the danger of security breaches like computer 
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hacking, betrayal or even human errors. By using a (t, n) threshold scheme with n = 2t- 1 we 
get a very robust key management scheme: We can recover the original key even when [n/2] 
= t- 1 of the n pieces are destroyed, but our opponents cannot reconstruct the key even when 
security breaches expose [n/2] = t- 1 of the remaining t pieces.  
In other applications the tradeoff is not between secrecy and reliability, but between 
safety and convenience of use. Consider the following example, Given a Company that 
digitally signs all its checks If each executive is given a copy of the company’s secret signature 
key, the system is convenient but easy to misuse. If the cooperation of all the company’s 
executives is necessary in order to sign each check, the system is safe but inconvenient. The 
standard solution requires at least three signatures per check, and it is easy to implement with 
a (3, n) threshold scheme. Each executive is given a small magnetic card with one Ui piece, 
and the company’s signature generating device accepts any three of them in order to generate 
and later destroy a temporary copy of the actual signature key s. The device does not contain 
any secret information and thus It doesn’t need to be a tamper-proof system. An unfaithful 
executive must have at least two accomplices in order to forge the company’s signature in this 
scheme. Threshold schemes are Ideally suited to applications in which a group a of mutually 
suspicious individuals with conflicting interests must cooperate. Ideally we would like the 
cooperation to be based on mutual consent, but the veto power this mechanism gives to each 
member can paralyze the activities of the group. By properly choosing the k and n parameters 
we can give any sufficiently large majority the authority to take some action while giving any 
sufficiently large minority the power to block it 
Some of the useful properties of this (t, n) threshold scheme are:  
(1). The size of each piece does not exceed the size of the original data. 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(2). shares can be dynamically added or deleted without affecting the other shares 
keeping the threshold t fixed.  
(3). By changing the polynomial to a new polynomial f(x) with the same constant term. 
We can easily change the shares without changing the original secret s; frequent change 
of this type can greatly enhance security since the shares exposed by security breaches 
cannot be accumulated unless all of them are values of the same edition of the f(x) 
polynomial.  
(4). By using tuples of polynomial values as shares, we can get a hierarchical scheme 
in which the number of shares needed to determine s depends on their importance. For 
example, To implement a project if we give the company's Manager has four values of 
f(x), each team leader has three values of f(x), and each Engineer has two value of f(x), 
then a (4, n) threshold scheme enables the project to be implemented either by any three 
members, or by any two team leaders one of whom is a Team leader, or by the Manager 
alone.  
Share Generation Protocol: Dealer D divides the secret s among n shareholders such that at 
least t shares are required  to reconstruct the secret. The share generation protocol is as follows: 
(i). Dealer creates a random polynomial f(x) of degree (t-1) and a constant term a0 
where a0 is the secret s in a finite field (which is known to all the shareholders and the 
dealer as well ). f(x) = a0 + a1x + a2x2 +......... +at-1xt-1 mod P where a1, a2 ,..at-1 are 
random polynomials and P is a large prime.  
(ii). Dealer randomly selects n distinct points (xi ≠ 0), calculates each share value and 
distributes the share to each shareholder secretly. share is represented by Si = (xi, f(xi)) 
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where i = 1,2......, n. xi value is a known value. So for our convenience, we chose xi = 
i. Therefore, s1 = f(1), s2 = f(2)......, sn = f(n) and the secret s = f(0).  
Secret Reconstruction Protocol:  
In the n shareholders any subset of t or more shares can be used to reconstruct the 
secret. The shareholder’s subset is: f(1), f(2)....f(t).  
Then we use the Lagrange interpolating formula to find the polynomial f(x), such that degree 
of f(x)<t and f(i) = Si for i = 1,2,......,n. In this the reconstructed secret is found by f(0).  
Given any t of n pairs of (i, f (i)) , with distinct i values, there is a unique polynomial f(x) of 
degree t-1, passing through all these points. This polynomial can be effectively computed from 
the pairs (i, f (i)) .  
Lagrange’s interpolating formula:  
In numerical analysis, Lagrange polynomials are used for polynomial interpolation. For 
a given set of distinct points xi and numbers yi, the Lagrange polynomial is the polynomial of 
the least degree that at each point xi assumes the corresponding value yi (i.e. the functions 
coincide at each point). The interpolating polynomial of the least degree is unique, however, 
and it is therefore more appropriate to speak of "the Lagrange form" of that unique polynomial 
rather than "the Lagrange interpolation polynomial", since the same polynomial can be arrived 
at through multiple methods. The polynomial f(x) can be calculated using Lagrange’s 
interpolating formula as stated below Given a set of k + 1 data points 
(x0,y0),(x1,y1),(x2,y2)…..(xk,yk) where xi ≠ xj, 
The interpolation polynomial in the Lagrange form is a linear combination 
 
Table 2.1 Lagrange’s interpolating formula  
 16 
Li(x) f (x) 
Li(x) =
"#"$"%#"$  
Where  j≠i  
f(x) = f(i) 	∗ 	Li(x)	.%/0   
i=1 where Li(x) is the Lagrange interpolating polynomial.  
 
Shamir’s (t, n) Secret Sharing Scheme satisfies security requirements of a (t, n) SS. 
That are, with ‘t’ or more than ‘t’ shares we can reconstruct the secret and with fewer than ‘t’ 
shares we cannot obtain any information of secret. During secret reconstruction phase, non-
shareholders may claim that they have shares which are fake and thus the other honest 
shareholders get nothing but a faked secret. For the fair reconstruction of the secret, cheater 
detection and/or identification are very essential. However, Shamir’s original secret sharing 
scheme doesn’t prevent malicious behavior of dishonest shareholders. So, Shamir’s SS scheme 
is unconditionally secure. 
2.1.2 Verifiable Secret Sharing 
Using Shamir’s secret sharing, dealer may benefit from behaving maliciously. Dealer is 
assumed to be reliable. But, in reality, dealer can give inconsistent shares to the shareholders. 
Thus, t participants cannot be able to reconstruct the secret. Verifiable Secret Sharing addresses 
this issue. VSS has remained as an important area of cryptographic research for the last two 
decades. Using VSS,  
1. Shares are verifiable without revealing shares and secret 
2.  Convinces shareholders that their shares are k-consistent 
3. Each shareholder assures that every subset of k out of n defines the same secret 
4. Detects malicious dealer or malicious shareholder 
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End-to-end auditable voting systems, threshold software key escrow, secure storage are some 
application of VSS.  
In a VSS scheme a dealer, wishes to share a secret among a group of n parties, at most 
t of which (possibly including the dealer) may be actively malicious, is a fundamental 
cryptographic primitive, lying at the core of secure multi-party computation (MPC). The 
property of verifiability enables participants to verify that their shares are consistent according 
to the security property. In Feldman’s VSS scheme is that the committed values are publicly 
known and the privacy of secret S depends on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm 
problem. In other words, Feldman’s scheme is computationally secure. Later, Pedersen 
(Pedersen, 1992) used a commitment scheme to remove the assumption in Feldman’s VSS 
scheme to propose a VSS scheme which is information theoretically secure. However, in 
Pedersen’s VSS scheme the dealer can succeed in distributing incorrect shares if the dealer can 
solve the discrete logarithm problem.  
The efficiency of a VSS protocol is measured by other parameters as well:  
1. The number of rounds of communication required. 
 2. The number of bits which must be communicated between processors. 
 3. The number of computations the processors must do. 
Chor, Goldwasser, MicaH, and Awerbuch [CGMA] introduced the notion of VSS. They 
present a constant round interactive scheme for verifiable secret sharing based on the assumed 
intractability of factorization. In their solution, t=O(logn), u=O(n); the communication 
complexity is exponential in t. 
Feldman’s Scheme: 
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A commonly used example of a simple VSS scheme is the protocol by Paul Feldman, 
which is based on Shamir's secret sharing scheme combined with any homomorphic 
encryption scheme. This scheme is, at best, secure for computationally bounded adversaries 
only. The following description gives the general idea, but is not secure as written. (Note, in 
particular, that the published value gs leaks information about the dealer’s secret s.) 
First, a cyclic group G of prime order p, along with a generator g of G, is chosen publicly as a 
system parameter. The group G must be chosen such that computing discrete logarithms is 
hard in this group. (Typically, one takes a subgroup of (Zq)*, where q is a prime such 
that p divides q-1.) 
The dealer then computes (and keeps secret) a random polynomial P of degree t with 
coefficients in Zp, such that P (0) =s, where s is the secret. Each of the n shareholders will 
receive a value P (1), ..., P(n) modulo p. Any t+1 shareholders can recover the secret s by 
using polynomial interpolation modulo p, but any set of at most t shareholders cannot. (In 
fact, at this point any set of at most t share iholders has no information about s.) 
So far, this is exactly Shamir's scheme. To make these shares verifiable, the dealer distributes 
commitments to the coefficients of P. If P(x) = s + a1x + ... + atxt, then the commitments that 
must be given are c0 = gs, c1 = ga1, ... ct = gat. 
Once these are given, any party can verify their share. For instance, to verify that v = P(i) 
mod q, party i can check that. 
Introduction to Bivariate Polynomials: 
A polynomial in two variables (that is a bivariate polynomial) with constant 
coefficients is given by anm xn ym + ……………..a22 x2 y2 + a21 x2 y + a12 x y2 + a11 x y + a10 x  
+ a01 y + a 00 which can be generalized as f(x,y) = ⅀i,j  ai,j  xi  yj 
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Uniqueness: 
It is possible to find one polynomial which has a degree n-1 passes through n points. 
Assuming the (xi, yj) where i = 1,...,n , pairs of values are unique. Since there are n points, the 
degree of the interpolating polynomial must have n terms. Thus, the form of the interpolating 
polynomial may be various, for example, given four points in a square, (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 
1), the logical choice is P(x,y) = c1 x y + c2 x + c3 y + c4 
Let f (x, y) be a function defined for a surface. Given points ((x1, y1), z1), ((x2, y2), z2), 
..., ((xn, yn), zn). To find an interpolating polynomial, we simply substitute the points into the 
bivariate polynomial, and obtained naturally a system of linear equations in the coefficients 
which may then be solved using Gaussian elimination or LU decomposition. 
Proactive Secret Sharing: 
Secret sharing with share refreshing is called proactive secret sharing. PSS reduces the 
window of vulnerability during which an adversary must compromise more than t servers in 
order to learn the secret. Without share refreshing, the window of vulnerability is unbounded; 
with PSS, the window of vulnerability is shortened to the period between two consecutive 
executions of share refreshing. We assume a system of n servers, A={P1, P2, P3, ……….Pn} 
that will share a secret value, x, through a (t+1,n), threshold scheme. Each server in A is 
connected to a common broadcast channel, C, with a property that messages sent on C instantly 
reach every part connected to it.  
In the proactive approach, the secret lifetime is divided into periods of time. At the 
beginning of each time period, the shareholders engage in an interactive update protocol, after 
which they hold completely new shares of the same secret. Previous shares become obsolete 
and should be safely erased. At the end of update phase, the servers hold new shares of secret 
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x. Proactive secret sharing has numerous applications, primarily, maintaining data which is 
long-lived in scenarios where availability and secrecy are crucial.  
Algorithm: 
The secret x Ɛ Zq, is encoded into n pieces x1,x2,x3,…….,xn Ɛ Zq, using a k-threshold 
Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme. After the initialization, at the beginning of every time period, 
all honest servers trigger an update phase, in which the servers perform a share renewal 
protocol. The shares computed in period t are denoted by xi(t), t=1, 2………., n. To renew the 
shares at period t=1, 2……………, n, we can update the polynomial, as follows: 
1. Pi picks k random numbers { δim } m Ɛ {1…..K}  from Zq. These define a polynomial  δi(z) 
= δi1Z1 + δi2Z2  + …………….. δikZk.  
2. For all those servers Pj , Pi  secretly sends ui,j = δi (j) (mod q) to Pj . 
3. After decrypting, uji  , Ɐj Ɛ {1,2,…….., n} , Pi  computes its new share xi (t)                               xi 
(t-1) + (u1i+ u2i + u3i +…………… uni)(mod q) and erases all the variables it used except 
of its current key, xi (t). 
This protocol solves the share renewal problem against a malicious user learning the secret 
information available to corrupted servers. The idea of Proactive secret sharing is periodically 
renewing the shares without changing the secret, in such a way that any information learned 
by the adversary about the individual shares become obsolete after the time period.  
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CHAPTER 3 
     OUR SCHEME 
 
3.1 Motivation   
Threshold cryptography is the study of multiparty computation protocols for different 
cryptographic functions (e.g. signing or decrypting) in which each group member receives a 
share of a private key generated by the group manager (GM) initially and then uses the share 
later to jointly compute an output of the cryptographic function.  Shamir’s )n,t(  SS has been 
used in conjunction with other public-key algorithms, such as RSA scheme [6] or ElGamal 
scheme [7], in threshold algorithms.  For example, [8, 9] are based on the ElGamal scheme, 
[10-13] are based on the RSA, [14, 15] are based on the Elliptic Curve public-key scheme and 
[16] is based on Pairing.  Since shares are protected by public-key algorithms, shares can be 
used repeatedly to compute multiple outputs.  Both Secret Sharing and threshold cryptography 
are very active research areas in cryptography.  In the processing to compute output of a 
threshold function, values computed by group members also need to be protected, i.e. shares 
with the respective shareholders needs to be protected, otherwise, non-members who is not a 
shareholder for the secret s can obtain the output as well. For example, in a threshold 
decryption, non-members can recover the plaintext if information exchanged among group 
members is not protected. So we encrypt the information exchanged among groups. Thus, the 
security problem as we have described in the secret reconstruction process also exists in 
threshold cryptographic applications.   
3.2 Contribution 
In the secret reconstruction of the Shamir’s (t,n)  secret sharing scheme (SS) the shares 
released by shareholders need to be protected otherwise any non-shareholders can also obtain 
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the secret.  Key establishment protocol can establish pairwise keys for any pair of shareholders. 
Then, shareholders can use these pairwise keys to protect shares in the secret reconstruction 
process. But by adding a key establishment in the secret reconstruction slows down the process 
significantly.  Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme is based on a univariate polynomial. Shares 
generated by a bivariate polynomial enable pairwise keys to be shared between any pair of 
shareholders. In this paper, we introduce a new type of SS, called protected secret sharing 
scheme (PSS), in which shares of shareholders can not only be used to reconstruct the secret 
but also be used to protect the secrecy of shares in the secret reconstruction process.  Thus, the 
recovered secret is only available to shareholders but not to non-shareholders. A basic (t,n)  
PSS based on a bivariate polynomial is proposed. We also introduced how to use this basic 
Protected Secret Sharing (PSS) in the applications of threshold cryptography.  The Protected 
Secret Sharing (PSS) Scheme is unique since it protects the secrecy of the recovered secret in 
a very efficient way. There is one major difference between shares generated by a univariate 
polynomial and by a bivariate polynomial.  The shares generated by a univariate polynomial 
are integers in GF(p) but shares generated by a bivariate polynomial are univariate 
polynomials.  
 In Shamir’s (t,n) SS [1], the dealer selects a univariate polynomial, f(x) with degree t-1 
and f(0)=s where s is the secret.  The dealer generates shares, f(xi) mod p where i=1,2,3,…n  
for shareholders, where p is a prime with p>s and xi is the public information associated with 
each shareholder Ui Each share, f(xi) is an integer in GF(P)  Shamir’s (t,n)  SS satisfies security 
requirements of a (t,n) SS.  That are, (a) with t or more than t shares can reconstruct the secret, 
and  
(b) with fewer than t shares cannot obtain any information of the secret.   
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Therefore, Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme is unconditionally secure. 
Using Shannon’s definition of entropy, any SS involving a set, P of shareholders and having 
the access structure, ,G  needs to satisfy two requirements: 
i)  Correctness: For any qualified subset, A⊆P of shareholders can recover the secret, s 
Formally, for all A∈ Γ it holds. H(s|A) =0. 
ii)  Security: For any unqualified subset, A⊆P of shareholders cannot recover the secret, 
.s  Formally, for all 𝐴 ∉ Γ it holds 0<H(s|A)≤ 𝐻(𝑠)  
3.2.1 Definition 1. Perfect Secret Sharing Scheme (Perfect SS) 
In above security requirement, if for any A∈ Γ it holds H(s|A) =H(s) (that is, shareholders 
in A obtain no information on s), the SS is called a  perfect SS.  
 In Shamir’s (t,n) SS, shareholders cannot verify the validity of their shares obtained from 
the dealer. In 1985, Chor et al. [26] extended the notion of SS and proposed the first verifiable 
secret sharing (VSS). Verifiability is the property of a VSS which allows shareholders to verify 
their shares. Invalid shares may be caused either by the dealer during share generation or by 
channel noise during transmission. VSS is performed by shareholders after receiving their 
shares from the dealer and before using their shares to reconstruct the secret.  If invalid shares 
have been detected, shareholders can request the dealer to regenerate new shares. There are 
many (t,n)  VSSs [27-32] using bivariate polynomials, denoted them as BVSSs.  A bivariate 
polynomial with degree t-1 can be represented as  
F(x,y)=a0,0 + a1,0x + a0,1y + a2,0x2 + a0,2y2 + a1,2xy2 + a2,1x2y + a2,2x2y2 +…+ at-1,t-1xt-1yt-1 mod P 
where  ai,j	∈ GF p 	∀i, j	 ∈ [0, t − 1] 
 We can classify the BVSSs into two types, the Symmetric BVSSs, denoted them as 
SBVSSs [29-32] and the Asymmetric BVSSs, denoted them as ABVSSs, [27, 29, 31].  If the 
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coefficients satisfy ai, j = aj, i		∀i, j	 ∈ [0, t − 1] then it is a symmetric bivariate polynomial.  
Shares generated by a bivariate polynomial can be used to establish pairwise keys between any 
pair of shareholders.  In all (t,n) SBVSSs, the dealer selects a bivariate polynomial, F(x,y) with 
degree t-1 and F(0,0)= s where s is the secret.  The dealer generates shares, F(xi,y) mod P where 
i=1,2,…n, for shareholders, where P is a prime with P > s and xi is the public information 
associated with each shareholder, Ui Each share, F(xi,y) is a univariate polynomial with degree 
t-1.Note that shares generated in a SBVSS satisfy F(xi,xj) = F(xj,xi) ∀i, j	 ∈ [0, t − 1]	the 
pairwise key, F(xi,xj) = F(xj,xi) can be established between the pair of shareholders, Ui and Uj 
In a similar way, in a ABVSS, the dealer generates a pair of shares, F(xi,y) mod P and F(x,xi) 
mod P where i=1,2,…n, for each shareholder and the pairwise secret key, F(xi,xj) or F(xj,xi) 
can also be established between the pair of shareholders, Ui and Uj  
3.2.2 The Basic (t,n) PSS Using a Bivariate Polynomial 
We first give the following definition. 
Definition 2. Protected Secret Sharing Scheme (PSS) 
In a PSS, shares of shareholders generated by the dealer initially can not only be used to 
compute the secret but also be used to protect shares in the secret reconstruction. Thus, the 
recovered secret is only available to shareholders but not available to non-shareholders.   
In Shamir’s (t,n) SS, additional key establishment protocol is needed to protect shares 
in the secret reconstruction; otherwise, any non-shareholders can also recover the secret. Thus, 
Shamir’s (t,n) SS is not a PSS.  
3.3 Share Generation and Authentication 
3.3.1 Private Share Generation 
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A secret s into n shares and divides it among n shareholders by the Group Manager in 
such a way that at least t shares are required to reconstruct the secret where ‘t’ is the threshold 
value that can be decided by the Group Manager (GM). The protocol for private share 
generation is designed as follows: 
3.3.2 Private Share Generation Protocol 
  Dealer selects a prime p where p > s, s being the secret.  
The dealer selects a symmetric bivariate polynomial of  h-1 degree (i.e., with 2t − 1 ≥ h >2t −3 We will explain this condition later in Theorem1 
F(x,y)=a0,0 + a1,0x + a0,1y + a2,0x2 + a0,2y2 + a1,2xy2 + a2,1x2y + a2,2x2y2 +…+ ah-1,h-1xh-1yh-1 mod 
P 
where. AM,N	 ∈ GF p 	, aM,N = aN,M	∀i, j	 ∈ [0, h − 1] 
  The dealer computes shares, si(y)=F(xi,y) mod P for shareholders, Ui where i=1,2,…n 
where xi is the public information associated with each shareholder, Ui The dealer sends each 
share, si(y) to shareholder Ui secretly. VSS is performed by shareholders after receiving their 
shares from the dealer and before using their shares to reconstruct the secret 
3.3.3 Public Shares Authentication  
After renewing each master secret on the centralized server, dealer needs to broadcast 
public shares of the renewed master secret to all shareholders. All shareholders can use their 
private shares to work together to authenticate the public shares of the master secret.  
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3.4 Master Secret Generation and Reconstruction 
3.4.1 Master Secret Generation 
Dealer constructs a (t,n) secret sharing scheme in such a way that for a given secret s 
only t or more than t shareholders can reconstruct the secret and less that t shareholders cannot 
reconstruct the secret. In our scheme each share for a shareholder is a univariate polynomial.  
3.4.2 Master Secret Generation Protocol  
Let the threshold of the new master secret be ‘t’, The dealer constructs a polynomial f 
(x,y) with degree h-1 and such that si(y)=F(xi,y) mod P, for i = 1,2,..., n, and F(0,0) = s where 
s is the secret., where s is the master secret, where xi is a publicly known parameter associated 
with each shareholder Ui .  
Remarks: (a) Dealer can use the Lagrange Interpolating formula to construct the polynomial  
f (x) = yM 	 P#PQPR#PQ mod	pVN/W,NXMVM/W   
3.4.3 Master Secret Reconstruction  
Secret Reconstruction is done in four basic following steps as listed below 
Let’s assume that U shareholders represented as {uZ[,\]^,…,\]`} want to reconstruct the secret. 
Here t≤ u ≤n 
Step 1. Each UZM uses his/her share,	SZR(y) to compute the pairwise shared keys ki,j, kM,N =𝑆ef(xZQ) = 𝐹(xZR, xZQ) where j=1,2,…,u and j≠i Here ki,j is the secret key shared between 
shareholders,UZR 
 and,UZQ   
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Step 2. (a)  If  t≤ u ≤ h each shareholder ,UZR computes the cipher text by encrypting the share 𝑆ef(y), CM,N = 	Ejf,Q(𝑆ef(y)) where  j=1,2,…,u  j≠i Here  Ejf,Q(𝑆ef(y)) denotes the 
conventional encryption of share 	SZR(y)  using the key ki,j  
(b) Otherwise, if h≤u each shareholder UZM computes the cipher text by encrypting  CM,N = 	Ejf,Q(wef) j=1,2,…,u  j≠i where  wef = Sef(0) #P]l		P]R#P]lmn/0,oXM mod P  
 Each shareholder UZM  sends the cipher ci,j, j=1,2,…,u  j≠i to other shareholders 
Step 3.   After receiving cipher text, cj,i, j=1,2,…,u  j≠i from other shareholders, UZM computes 
the decryption  Djf,Q(cN,M), j=1,2,…,u  j≠i where Djf,Q(cN,M) denotes the decryption of cj,i 
using the key ki,j 
Step 4.  (a) If t≤ u <h each shareholder UZM computes Djf,Q(cN,M) = SZQ(y) j=1,2,…,u  j≠i. Then, 
each shareholder UZM can use recovered shares to establish at least r(rs0)t  linearly 
independent equations, for example, by computing SZQ y , y=1,2,…,h and j=1,2,…u 
(i.e., F(xZQ, y) where y=1,2,…h and j=1,2,…,u. In other words, these linearly 
independent equations are expressed in terms of the coefficients, ai,j of the polynomial 
F(x,y) Then, the secret can be obtained from a0,0=s  
 (b) Otherwise, if h≤u each shareholder UZM computes Djf,Q(cN,M) = WZQ j=1,2,…,u  j≠i  
Then, the secret is recovered by computing	 WZR	mod	p = smM/0  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
                                SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE 
 
 
4.1 Security Analysis 
 
In this section, we will first prove that the basic protocol meets the security 
requirements of a SS.  Then, we will prove the protocol is a perfect SS as defined in Definition 
1 and a PSS as defined in Definition 2. We will also prove that our scheme is secure with 
different types of attacks Inside and Outside attack. 
4.1.1 Inside Attack 
Theorem 1. With 2t − 1 ≥ h > 2t −3 the proposed scheme satisfies both security 
requirements of a (t,n) Secret Sharing Scheme. That are,  
 (a) with t or more than t shares can recover the secret 
 (b) with fewer than t shares cannot recover the secret. 
Proof. F(x,y)=a0,0 + a1,0x + a0,1y + a2,0x2 + a0,2y2 + a1,2xy2 + a2,1x2y + a2,2x2y2 +…+ ah-1,h-1xh-1yh-
1 mod P is a symmetric polynomial with aM,N	 ∈ GF p 	, aM,N = aN,M	∀i, j	 ∈ [0, h − 1] 
Containing r(rs0)t  different coefficients of the polynomial F(x,y). In the proposed scheme, each 
share, si(y) is a univariate polynomial with degree h-1. In other words, each shareholder can 
use his share to establish h linearly independent equations in terms of the coefficients of the 
polynomial F(x,y) With t-1 shares together, it can establish h(t-1) linearly independent 
equations. Since 
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 h>2t-3 as specified in the share generation, we get r(rs0)t >h(t-1). Thus, any t-1 colluded 
shareholders cannot recover the secret.  This conclusion is obtained without making any 
computational assumption.  On the other hand, when there are ‘t’ or more than ‘t’ shareholders 
trying to recover the secret, with their shares together, they can establish ‘ht’ linearly 
independent equations.  Since 2t-1≥h as specified in the share generation, we have ht≥ r(rs0)t   
Thus, any t or more than t shareholders can recover the secret. 
Corollary 1.1.  For any given threshold, t the degree of the symmetric polynomial, F(x,y) can 
either be 2t-1 or 2t-2.  
Proof.  This corollary can be obtained directly from Theorem 1.   
We now want to prove that our proposed basic scheme is a perfect Secret Sharing Scheme.  
Theorem 2. The proposed basic scheme using a bivariate polynomial is a perfect SS as defined 
in Definition 1. 
Proof.  Let us prove this theorem following Definition 1 Correctness and Security. 
 i) Correctness: We consider two cases separately with t≤u<hand with h≤u. 
(a). If t ≤ u < h, as we have discussed in Theorem 1, with t or more than t shareholders we 
can recover the secret.  In Step 4, each shareholder 
ivU  after obtaining u shares, can establish 
at least r(rs0)t   linearly independent equations, such as ),y(s jv  y=1,2,..h and j=1,2,…u (i.e., 
),y,x(F
jv
 y=1,2,..h and j=1,2,…u in terms of the coefficients, ai,j of the polynomial F(x,y) 
Then, the secret can be obtained as a0,0=s 
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(b). If h≤u according to the Lagrange interpolation formula, we can get  Sef(y)m%/0 P#P]l		P]R#P]lmn/0,oXM mod P=F(x,y). Thus, in Step 4, we get wefmod	PmM/0 =Sef(0)m%/0 #P]l		P]R#P]lmn/0,oXM mod P =F(0,0)=s 
This concludes that for any qualified subset, A={uZ[,\]^,…,\]`}∈ 	Γ, of shareholders can work 
together to recover the secret.
 
Hence, it holds that H(s|A)=0 
ii) Security: In our proposed scheme, all the information exchanged among shareholders is 
encrypted using pairwise shared keys. Since non-shareholder does not own any share generated 
by the dealer, non-shareholder cannot decrypt any cipher text.  Thus, the recovered secret is 
not available to non-shareholder. In other words, non-shareholder obtain no information on .s
Furthermore, since dealer selects a h-1 degree symmetric polynomial, F(x,y) as we have 
discussed in Theorem 1, it needs at least t shares to recover the secret polynomial F(x,y) For 
any unqualified subset, B={uZ[,\]^,…,\]y}∉ 	Γ, with 0<r<t of shareholders cannot establish 
sufficient number of linearly independent equations to recover F(x,y) and therefore cannot get 
s from wefmod	PzM/0  Namely, shareholders in B obtain no information on s Hence, it holds 
that H(s|A)=H(s). Therefore, according to Definition 1, the proposed basic scheme is a perfect 
Secret Sharing Scheme. 
4.1.2 Outside Attack
 
Outside Attack: The proposed basic scheme is a PSS as defined in Definition 2. 
Proof. In this basic scheme, from Theorems, 1 and 2, shares of shareholders generated by the 
dealer can not only be used to compute the secret in Step 1 but also be used to protect 
information exchanged among shareholders in Step 2. Thus, non-shareholders cannot obtain 
the secret.  According to Definition 2, the basic scheme is a PSS. 
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4.2 Performance 
 In the basic PSS, each share,Si(y) is a univariate polynomial with degree h-1 Thus, 
each 
shareholder needs to store h coefficients of a univariate polynomial. The memory storage of 
each 
shareholder is hlog2p bits, where P is the modulus.  Horner’s rule [33] can be used to evaluate 
polynomials.  In the following discussion, we show the cost for computing		𝑤ef =𝑆ef(0) #"|}		"|f#"|}~n/0,nX% mod P  in the secret reconstruction.  From Horner’s rule, evaluating 
a polynomial of degree h-1 needs h-1 multiplications and h additions. Since multiplication 
takes 
more time than addition, the performance is only addressed to the number of multiplications 
needed. The computational cost in Step 1 to compute 𝑊ef is to evaluate one polynomial. The 
computational cost in Step 2 to compute pairwise shared keys,	kM,N = 𝑆ef(xZQ) where j=1,2,…,u 
and j≠i   is to evaluate u-1 polynomials, where u is the number of shareholders participated in 
the secret reconstruction. Overall, the computational cost to reconstruct the secret of each 
shareholder is to compute ‘uh’ multiplications.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
APPLICATION TO ALGORITHMS OF THRESHOLD CRYTOGRAPHY 
 
In a threshold algorithm, the GM is responsible to select a pair of public and private 
keys of the group and to register group members initially.  The GM follows our proposed 
basic PSS in Section 3 to treat the private key of the group as the secret and generate shares 
of group members.  The share of each group member is a univariate polynomial with degree 
.h 1-  In the process to compute the threshold function, each group member uses his/her share 
to compute the function output and pairwise keys shared with other group members.  Then, 
the output is encrypted using pairwise shared keys with other group members and send the 
cipher text to other group members. Similarly, all received cipher text needs to be decrypted 
using pairwise shared keys with other group members.  The output of the threshold function 
is finally obtained from these decrypted cipher text.  Since non-members do not have any 
share generated by the GM, non-members cannot decrypt the cipher text.  Thus, the output of 
threshold function is not available to non-members. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A new type of SS, called protected secret sharing (PSS), is introduced . In a PSS, shares 
of shareholders can not only be used to compute the secret but also be used to protect shares 
in the secret reconstruction.  A basic (t,n) PSS using a bivariate polynomial is proposed. 
Security and performance analysis of the scheme is also included.  We extend the basic 
scheme to threshold algorithms. The PSS is unique since it protects the secrecy of the 
recovered secret in an efficient way.  In secret sharing scheme, the master secret and all the 
private shares of shareholders are to be maintained secretly. In all the existing secret sharing 
schemes, we can reconstruct the secret but cannot authenticate the shareholder. But in our 
approach, we can authenticate the shareholders thereby preventing the malicious users gaining 
knowledge of secret.  
All the existing sharing schemes, assume that the shareholders are reliable and cannot 
be attacked. Therefore, we authenticate only the shares from shareholders but not the 
shareholders itself. In our scheme, we authenticate the shareholders to determine the 
shareholder identity before reconstructing the secret. If the shareholder is not authenticated, 
then the secret cannot be reconstructed using his share. A new share is requested from the 
dealer by this shareholder and then he can participate in the secret reconstruction using his 
new share only if he is authenticated using his new share. By implementing this PSS, not only 
the master key is secured but also its reconstruction is secured. 
We proposed a scheme based on bivariate polynomial, where we use the property of 
symmetry to authenticate the shareholders. We added this feature of authentication to the 
existing features like secrecy, efficiency, confidentiality, which are to be satisfied by every 
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secret sharing scheme. We mentioned our approach of Protected Secret Sharing, public and 
private share generation, and authentication protocols. Then we discussed master secret 
reconstruction protocol which uses VSS and symmetric property of bivariate polynomial 
coefficients to authenticate shareholders and reconstruct the secret.  
 
6.1 Open Problems  
One of the open problem for secret sharing is to improve the O (n/log n) bound at least 
by a factor of log n. The above bound is a consequence of Shannon’s inequalities for the 
entropy function. One more problem of the SS scheme is to have limitation for finite n instead 
of going infinite i.e. does there exist an (infinite, ∞) scheme where secret is determined by 
arbitrary infinite collections of shares, but which is independent of any finite collection of 
shares. To use secret-sharing schemes, we should also require that the sharing process and the 
reconstruction are efficient. That is, when using secret-sharing schemes we want the honest 
parties, which share secrets and reconstruct them, to run in polynomial time. 
If all the private shares are able to recover the master secret, then the secret is no longer 
secure. So it is necessary to renew the master secret keeping all the private shares secure. If 
all the private shares are kept secure during secret reconstruction, dealer only needs to renew 
master secret but not the private shares. So in this way, the secret sharing scheme becomes 
even more efficient as the private shares can be reused for a longer period of time.  
If once the shareholders are able to recover the master secret, then the secret is no longer 
secure. So it is necessary to refresh both the shares and secret at the same time.  
One of the limitations of protected secret scheme is that they assume the set of 
shareholders remain same for a given secret sharing. The protected secret sharing scheme 
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could further be improved by adding and deleting shareholders while sharing the same master 
secret.  
6.2 Future Work 
This Protected Sharing Schemes addresses the main problem of authentication in secret 
sharing. We used bivariate polynomials not just for authentication but also for secret sharing. 
If this is employed to all the exiting secret sharing schemes, security is enhanced to the 
maximum level. PSS can be used in Public Key Infrastructure(PKI) schemes where certificate 
authority(CA), is used to generate digital signatures. CA needs to authenticate the parties for 
secret reconstruction. PSS can be used for this purpose. CA has a private key for generating 
digital signatures. Instead of storing the entire key secretly, it is better to divide the key into 
number of shares and share the key. This private key can be stored as a secret, and is shared in 
a secret sharing scheme. By using PSS, we can authenticate, shareholders thereby preventing 
the secret reconstruction in the existence of malicious users. Adding and removing 
shareholders is also easy, as they need to only satisfy that Symmetric property, then can 
perform in secret reconstruction.  
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